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Abstract:  Rowlands applies the two organizing ideas of the Lockean concept of personhood — 
mental life and unity — to animals as potential persons. Especially valuable in this context is his 
descriptive phenomenology of pre-reflective self-awareness as a fundamental form of mental life 
that necessarily entails unity. Rowland describes certain fundamentals of mental experience that 
exist across species boundaries, challenging assumptions of early modern philosophers regarding 
the definition of human personhood and affirming the principle of evolutionary continuity. This 
opens the door to a broader and deeper set of questions, related to whether we should continue 
to attempt to apply to other animals — or to ourselves — philosophical models that are ancient 
and revered but contradicted in significant measure by contemporary scientific findings, 
especially in evolutionary biology. 
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1.  Philosophical Models of Personhood. Rowlands (2016) begins his target article by noting 
that concepts of personhood are variously defined as legal, moral, and metaphysical. He 
addresses the metaphysical specifically as defined by Locke. Pragmatically speaking, the legal 
case for animal personhood is advancing in the absence of metaphysical foundation — case by 
case, as the sciences shape our understanding of other animals and as real life situations make 
moral demands upon us for remediation (Benvenuti, 2016). 
Rowlands produces a convincing metaphysics of personhood satisfying the requirements 
of the Western philosophical tradition, particularly as advanced by Locke. We must remain 
aware of the distinction between satisfying the requirements of Western metaphysics as a 
human cultural artifact and making a true declaration about reality. The Western philosophical 
tradition has placed high value on the human capacity for rational abstraction. I (Benvenuti, 
2014, 2016) have repeatedly argued that this evaluation of our capacity for rational abstraction 
— especially as contrasted with affective awareness — lacks merit. Human cognition has 
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repeatedly been demonstrated to be largely unconscious, fundamentally affective, and 
fragmentary, and not the accurate rational perception of early modern philosophers’ dreams. 
Rowlands notes that many people adopt Locke’s concept of personhood, knowingly or 
unknowingly: The Lockean concept is a big assumption, especially given its roots in Aristotle’s 
(problematic) ontology of beings. The Aristotelian ontology that pervades Western metaphysics 
deserves reexamination, particularly its notion of human distinctness from and superiority to 
other animals because of our capacity for abstract thought. Aristotle asserted that all animals 
share fundamental affective awareness motivated towards experiences that enhance the self 
and away from experiences that would diminish the self. That, combined with the capacity to 
move towards and away from experiences, is his definition of animal life. This is quite similar to 
the pre-reflective awareness described by Rowlands. Aristotle further observed that other 
animals are incapable of the kind of thinking that allows the mind to move beyond the limits of 
time and space within which the body is confined. The problem-solving capacity of animals, now 
well documented, suggests that Aristotle was mistaken. What Rowlands laudably accomplishes 
with his analysis of Lockean personhood is the detachment of self-awareness and unity from 
Aristotle’s notion of abstract thought and its modern derivative, “higher order” cognition, by 
developing the category of pre-reflective self-awareness. 
 
2.  Evolutionary Continuity and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. Rowlands does much more than 
satisfy the requirements of Lockean personhood for mental experience and unity. His detailed 
analysis of awareness as self-awareness is reminiscent of Abram’s (2011) narrative in Becoming 
Animal. As animals, we move through a world, knowing it in relation to our particular sensual 
bodies, motivated to encounter certain things and to avoid others. In other words, our animal 
bodies determine the shape of the world we encounter: we cannot encounter objects in the 
world without encountering the self in the same experience. Pre-reflective self-awareness as 
described and analyzed by Rowlands (after Sartre, 1943) may well be the definition of animal 
life, including human-animal life. 
The principle of evolutionary continuity is based on the evidence that all life descends 
from a common ancestor, with modifications that enhance adaptation to environmental niches. 
It follows that all life shares some features, that all animals share a subset of the features of all 
life, and so forth. Studies of the mammalian brain show primary affective motivational states 
that cross species boundaries, including an awareness of objects in the world and an embodied 
readiness to act that is so close to the self/other awareness boundary that these affective 
experiences might be thought of as the very awakening of consciousness (Panksepp & Biven, 
2012). These primary affects are remarkably similar to Rowlands’s description of pre-reflective 
awareness, particularly to affordances as “perception for action,” in which self-awareness is the 
subjective sense of being oneself and not the more reflective capacity to view oneself as an 
object of one’s own concern. The first type of self-awareness falls into Shoemaker’s (1968) 
category of “immune to error through misidentification,” as analyzed by Rowlands: it is possible 
to doubt that I am correctly seeing my shadow or my image in a reflective surface, but it is not 
possible to doubt irreducible feeling states. Rowlands makes the strong case that there is a 
severe logical problem in the idea that we validate self-awareness by moving to greater levels of 
abstraction, making a distant object of the self. Rather, self-awareness can only be the self of 
direct experience, the kind of self that we share with other animals. 
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On the basis of the principle of evolutionary continuity, we would expect that large 
categories of experience, such as fundamental motivations, developmental trajectories, 
communication, and mental life (including fundamental self-awareness) would be shared across 
species. It is more reasonable to reject ontologies founded in imaginary hierarchical 
constructions and to conclude that all animals think, feel, intend, and communicate than to 
assume that they do not. In a similar way, it is more reasonable to expect that animals would 
share some features of personhood than to doubt a priori that they could do so. 
Animal personhood does not mean human personhood in other species. It means that 
there are probably many forms of expression of person-like features among animal species. 
These variations are not indicators of lesser personhood but of variance in how personhood is 
experienced and expressed. Defining animal life in comparison to features of human life makes 
us devalue animal traits unlike our own, but it prevents us from perceiving the ways a general 
trait, such as mind or feeling, might exist in other animals. 
We can ask how each kind of animal experiences its own self. Rowlands has described 
the phenomenology of pre-reflective awareness determined by an animal’s particular body and 
sensory apparatus and by its particular needs and desires for in its world of objects. Not all 
species are highly visual, as is required for Gallup’s (1970) mirror self-recognition test: We would 
not expect cephalopods, who know the world by taste, to recognize a dot placed on their 
forehead. We would not expect this from dogs. Bekoff (2001) developed a scent-based pilot 
study using urine to test dog self-awareness. Rowlands’s pre-reflective awareness might yield 
fundamental and shared self-awareness in any kind of body that encounters the world through 
senses related to motivational states. 
 
3.  Human Unconsciousness: The (Human) Psychological Factor. Whereas humans share pre-
reflective self-awareness with other animals, we have an unusual capacity to override basic 
awareness, especially via our commitment to abstract ideas that color our perceptions and 
disguise our motivations. Our capacity for abstract thought allows us to distance ourselves from 
fundamental motives, all the more so when affect is derided as subhuman. When Descartes 
(1637) said that animals do not feel pain when they cry out, but that they are, in that cry, acting 
like a mechanical alarm indicating malfunction, he was using the kind of abstract reasoning, 
“purified” of affective passions, that has since been held up as the pinnacle of cognitive 
capacity. Yet Descartes’s proposition is one that most people today find both wrong and morally 
offensive. Upon hearing it, they make a “disgust face” — that shared feature of animal life that 
expresses moral repugnance (Bekoff & Pierce, 2009, Churchland, 2011). Descartes’s affective 
motivations led him to use abstract thought in a morally convenient and empirically incorrect 
manner that defies what most of us would call common sense. I do not wish to promote some 
vague idea of “common sense” over empirical evidence; but there is a rich literature on the 
“common sense” of body-to-body affective communication by which we know the state of the 
other implicitly to varying degrees of accuracy, and by which we know that when an animal 
howls in pain, it feels pain. There is a hint of the deep tragedy of human unconsciousness in the 
image of Descartes going around with his own companion dog and still insisting that animals are 
machines. 
We Homo sapiens use our capacity for abstract thought to override our pre-reflective 
self-awareness. This results in beliefs that contradict our pre-reflective awareness and are 
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demonstrably contrary to fact. The principle of evolutionary continuity is supported by an 
abundance of empirical evidence suggesting that personhood is a broadly distributed trait. 
Rowlands has shown how such evolutionary continuity could still satisfy Locke’s philosophical 
criteria, concluding that “hostility to the idea of animals being persons derives from the Lockean 
conception of the person, and the idea that self-awareness is necessary for personhood.”  
It is worth noting the persistence of certain philosophical notions even when 
contradicted by the evidence. I have described three: the Aristotelian notion that humans are 
distinct from and superior to other animals because of our capacity for abstract thought; the 
Cartesian notion that affective “passions” interfere with thought, rather than informing it; and 
the Lockean notion that only humans have the rational self-awareness required for personhood. 
Philosophical hostility to the idea of animal personhood may in fact derive from human 
psychological motives to consider ourselves distinct from and superior to other animals — to be 
authorized to use other animals de facto, and to avoid painful feelings of empathy for their 
suffering. We may find not only greater truthfulness but also a richer capacity to conceptualize 
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